Perhaps the impious will take refuge in the special character of poetry, saying that it is characteristic of poets to invent what does not exist and to tell false myths for the pleasure of their hearers, and that this is why they composed these stories about the gods. But this excuse will prove more hollow than any other when judged by the very opinions they themselves hold and put forward about these matters.
For if what the poets say is invented and false, then the very names Zeus, Cronus, Hera, Ares, and the others must also be false. Perhaps, as they say, even the names are invented: there is no Zeus at all, nor Cronus, nor Ares, but the poets fabricate them as though they existed in order to deceive their hearers. Yet if the poets invent beings that do not exist, how is it that people worship them as though they did exist?
Or perhaps they will say again that the names are not invented, but that the poets tell lies about their deeds. Yet this is no safer as a defense. If they fabricated the deeds, surely they also fabricated the names of those to whom they attributed the deeds. Or if they tell the truth about the names, then they must also tell the truth about the deeds.
Besides, those who tell stories that these are gods surely know what gods ought to do, and they would never ascribe human traits to gods, any more than someone would assign the work of fire to water. Fire burns, while water by nature is cold. If, then, the deeds are worthy of gods, those who do them would be gods. But if adultery and the deeds already mentioned belong to human beings—and not good human beings—then those who did them would be human beings, not gods.
For deeds must correspond to the nature of those who do them, so that the doer may be recognized from the deed and the deed may be known from the nature. Thus someone speaking about water and fire and describing their activities would not say that water burns and fire cools. Nor would someone speaking about the sun and the earth say that the earth gives light while the sun is sown with plants and fruits. Anyone who said such things would surpass every kind of madness.
In the same way, their writers—and especially the most distinguished poet of all—if they had known that Zeus and the others were gods, would not have attributed to them deeds that prove them not to be gods, but rather human beings, and not self-controlled human beings at that.
Or if, as poets, they lied, and you malign them, why did they not also lie about the courage of the heroes and invent weakness in place of courage and courage in place of weakness? As with Zeus and Hera, they should have falsely accused Achilles of cowardice and marveled at the strength of Thersites; they should have charged Odysseus with stupidity and invented madness for Nestor; they should have told of womanly deeds by Diomedes and Hector, and of manly courage in Hecuba. For if, as they say, poets fabricate and lie, they should have done so in every case. But as it is, they preserved the truth about human beings, while they were not afraid to tell falsehoods about the so-called gods.
Someone among them may say this as well: “They lie when they tell of the gods’ licentious deeds, but when they praise Zeus as father of gods, supreme, Olympian, and reigning in heaven, they are not inventing anything; they are speaking the truth.” But not only I—anyone could refute this argument against them. The truth becomes clear from the proofs already given. Their deeds expose them as human beings, while the praises given to them go beyond human nature. These two things do not fit together. It is neither characteristic of heavenly beings to do such things, nor possible to suppose that those who do such things are gods.
Perhaps the impious will take refuge in the special character of poetry, saying that it is characteristic of poets to invent what does not exist and to tell false myths for the pleasure of their hearers, and that this is why they composed these stories about the gods. But this excuse will prove more hollow than any other when judged by the very opinions they themselves hold and put forward about these matters.
For if what the poets say is invented and false, then the very names Zeus, Cronus, Hera, Ares, and the others must also be false. Perhaps, as they say, even the names are invented: there is no Zeus at all, nor Cronus, nor Ares, but the poets fabricate them as though they existed in order to deceive their hearers. Yet if the poets invent beings that do not exist, how is it that people worship them as though they did exist?
Or perhaps they will say again that the names are not invented, but that the poets tell lies about their deeds. Yet this is no safer as a defense. If they fabricated the deeds, surely they also fabricated the names of those to whom they attributed the deeds. Or if they tell the truth about the names, then they must also tell the truth about the deeds.
Besides, those who tell stories that these are gods surely know what gods ought to do, and they would never ascribe human traits to gods, any more than someone would assign the work of fire to water. Fire burns, while water by nature is cold.
If, then, the deeds are worthy of gods, those who do them would be gods. But if adultery and the deeds already mentioned belong to human beings—and not good human beings—then those who did them would be human beings, not gods.
For deeds must correspond to the nature of those who do them, so that the doer may be recognized from the deed and the deed may be known from the nature. Thus someone speaking about water and fire and describing their activities would not say that water burns and fire cools. Nor would someone speaking about the sun and the earth say that the earth gives light while the sun is sown with plants and fruits. Anyone who said such things would surpass every kind of madness.
In the same way, their writers—and especially the most distinguished poet of all—if they had known that Zeus and the others were gods, would not have attributed to them deeds that prove them not to be gods, but rather human beings, and not self-controlled human beings at that.
Or if, as poets, they lied, and you malign them, why did they not also lie about the courage of the heroes and invent weakness in place of courage and courage in place of weakness? As with Zeus and Hera, they should have falsely accused Achilles of cowardice and marveled at the strength of Thersites; they should have charged Odysseus with stupidity and invented madness for Nestor; they should have told of womanly deeds by Diomedes and Hector, and of manly courage in Hecuba. For if, as they say, poets fabricate and lie, they should have done so in every case. But as it is, they preserved the truth about human beings, while they were not afraid to tell falsehoods about the so-called gods.
Someone among them may say this as well: “They lie when they tell of the gods’ licentious deeds, but when they praise Zeus as father of gods, supreme, Olympian, and reigning in heaven, they are not inventing anything; they are speaking the truth.” But not only I—anyone could refute this argument against them. The truth becomes clear from the proofs already given. Their deeds expose them as human beings, while the praises given to them go beyond human nature. These two things do not fit together. It is neither characteristic of heavenly beings to do such things, nor possible to suppose that those who do such things are gods.